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PROCEDURAL NOTE CLARIFYING THE RECORD REGARDING 
DUPLICATE MEMORANDUM TITLES 
The record in this matter contains two documents identically titled "Plaintiffs Response 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" (R. Vol. II, p. 384-400), one filed on December 
6, 2012, and the other filed on March 5, 2013. (R. Vol. III, p. 577-601). The initial brief was 
withdrawn and substituted with the latter. (R. Vol. I, p. 5, L. 5). 
The initial brief was filed as a result of the Respondent attempting to have their Summary 
Judgment Motion heard before discovery could be conducted. This effort was denied by the trial 
court and discovery was allowed. After information was provided from the City, the Northern 
Idaho Building Contractors Association then substituted the initial brief with a more thorough 
and relevant response brief on March 15, 2013. The initial brief adds nothing of substance to the 
argument but the parties could not reach an agreement to remove it from the record, therefore 
this statement is provided to avoid confusion as to which brief is applicable. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Appellant in this case 1s the North Idaho Building Contractors Association 
(hereinafter "NIBCA"), a trade association of local home builders and small businesses who are 
dedicated to keeping home ownership affordable. The Respondent is the City of Hayden, Idaho. 
This case is before the Supreme Court of Idaho to resolve the issue of whether or not a 
municipality may bypass the traditional infrastructure funding mechanisms and pay for the 
expansion of a new sewer system through mandatory "Capitalization Fees." The subject of the 
suit is a fee that is not related to any current sewer system, but instead is to be used to fund the 
construction of a new $20 million expanded system into the City of Hayden's area of impact. (R. 
Aug., p. 0023). NIBCA maintains that, based upon Idaho Code and the litany of cases 
interpreting municipal authority, the law prohibits levying fees to raise revenue and/or pay for 
expansion into future use areas. The Respondent, the City of Hayden, has a differing 
interpretation, citing to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and Idaho's user fee statutes as authority for 
their fee. The City's logic is flawed in that neither of these statutes allow the use of a fee for 
expans10n. 
B. Proceedings Below and Standard Upon Appeal 
This case was decided in the lower court in part through Summary Judgment and 
thereafter through a Stipulation amongst the parties. 
In an appeal from an order for summary judgment, the Com1's standard of review is the 
same standard as that used by the district court in entering a motion for summary judgment. 
Major v. Security Equipment Corp., 155 Idaho 199 (2013). Entry of summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, 
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show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the 
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 
favor of such non-moving party. Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 851 (2011). The Respondent 
was the party moving for Summary Judgment, therefore all inferences are to be drawn in favor of 
NIBCA. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
The factual issues in this case are generally not in dispute; rather, it is the application of 
the law where the parties disagree. It is undisputed that the City charges two fees in relation to its 
sewer system: one fee for the maintenance, operation, and replacement of the current system, and 
a separate fee used to fund future expansion. Hayden calls their maintenance and operation fee a 
"bi-monthly fee" and the expansion fee a "capitalization fee." (R. Vol. III, p. 641 ,i 3). The bi-
monthly fee is not at issue in this case. 
The City also admits that the monies collected under the guise of the capitalization fees 
are planned to be used exclusively for future expansion. (R. Vol. I, p. 80). The City plans to use 
the capitalization fee to pay for its plan to bring sewer services out into virtually every part of the 
City's area of impact. 
The lower court did find "significant disputed facts regarding the allocation and 
expenditure of funds collected from the city's capitalization fee." (R. Vol. III, p. 654 1 2). 
However, the parties resolved these issues after the court's partial Summary Judgment decision. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 669-673). 
Additionally, there is no factual dispute as to how the fees are collected; all parties agree 
they are mandatory fees imposed when one applies for a building permit within the city. The 
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City will not issue a building permit without payment of the capitalization fee and all other fees 
levied by the City. (R. Aug., p. 0038 1 2). 
It is also undisputed that the City's Sewer Capitalization Fee was assessed in 2001 at 
$580.00 per residential unit or its equivalent. The fee then increased in 2005 to $737.00, 
increased again in 2006 to $774.00, and yet again on June 7, 2007 to $2,280.00, a roughly 195% 
increase. (R. Vol. III, p. 636 ,r 1 ). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the court err in ruling that the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code § 50-1027 et 
seq., authorizes municipalities to collect sewer system "connection fees," which are to be 
solely used to pay for future expansion? 
2. Did the court err in ruling that Idaho Code § 63-1311 authorizes municipalities to collect 
sewer system "user fees," which are to be solely used to pay for future expansion? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
This Court is being asked to uphold an illegal fee as a valid and appropriate way to fund 
future expansion and growth. In Idaho, cities can fund infrastructure growth through the 
issuance of bonds or through the implementation of Impact Fees. Idaho has enacted a very clear 
statutory scheme for cities to raise money for infrastructure necessitated by future growth 
pursuant to the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code § 67-8201 et seq. 
The IDIF A contains very clear checks and balances so as to prevent a city from extracting an 
arbitrary amount from its citizens. However, by circumventing the IDIF A, the city of Hayden is 
doing exactly that and charging its arbitrary fee under the ruse of a user fee or an equity buy-in 
fee. Respondent cites the authority granted under Idaho Code§ 63-1311 (user fees) and Idaho 
NIBCA APPELLANT BRIEF - PAGE 3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
• 
I 
I I 
Code § 50-1027 (equity buy-in fee) as justification for the City's capitalization fee. The 
difficulty with Respondent's argument, as illustrated herein, is that when the facts are applied to 
the case law interpreting these statutes it becomes apparent that there is no authority for the fee 
they have imposed. 
In addition to the capitalization fee, the city of Hayden also imposes a significant impact 
fee and a bi-monthly sewer user fee, neither of which the Builders have challenged in this 
litigation. 
B. Background of Unlawful Fee - No Relation to Current System 
In March, 2006, the Respondent engaged an engineering and surveyor firm, Welch 
Comer & Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "Welch Comer"), to a report pertaining to the City of 
Hayden's Sewer Master Plan. This report calculates a fee which expands and implements 
Respondent's sewer master plan layout to service the entirety of Respondent's defined area of 
impact. Even the report itself calls the City's vision an "'ambitious $20 million capital 
improvement plan." (R. Aug., p. 0041 ,I 13.5.2). When this $20 million infrastructure expansion 
is fully implemented, Respondent will have sewer services reaching out into areas not even 
closely associated with any current or perceived development. See for example Welch Comer 
report page 2, page 17, and page 29-30. (R. Aug., p. 0008; p. 0023; p. 0034-0035). 
On June 7, 2007, Respondent raised its self-defined "sewer capitalization fee" from 
$774.00 to $2,280.00 based solely on the analysis and report prepared by Welch Corner. (R. Vol. 
I, p. 114-15 ,i 29). The raise in the "sewage capitalization fee" was to be used for "capital 
improvements needed to serve new growth, and updated cost and build-out projections." Id. 
Despite the City's ordinance labeling this a "capitalization fee," counsel for Respondent 
repeatedly uses the term "capacity replacement." This phraseology is counsel's cleverly worded 
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term for expansion. It is clear that Respondent is just trying to justify expanding their system 
since this "replacement" theory is not supported by the Welch Comer report, which does not use 
the term "replacement," nor does it give any consideration to the current capacity of the system 
when calculating the fee. As stated supra in the Welch Comer report"[i]n order to finance this 
ambitious $20 million capital improvement plan, it is recommended that the City increase the 
sewer collection system capitalization fee." (R. Aug., p. 0041 ,I 13.5.2). The report exposes how 
the sewage capitalization fee was really calculated by taking the capital improvement plan total 
of $20,4 I 6,900.00 and dividing it by the arbitrarily projected potential future population of 
Respondent. Id. Incidentally, there is no basis for the growth projection in the report. Welch 
Comer's report simply used numbers fed to it by the City. (R. Aug., p. 0023 ,I 6.1). 
C. The City's fee is not tied to the buy-in of a current system, but is used exclusively 
to raise revenue and therefore is not an equity buy-in fee. 
The Idaho Revenue Bond Act in Title 50 of the Idaho Code authorizes the assessment of 
equity buy-in fees under the following conditions: 
[Any] city shall have the power under and subject to the following 
provisions ... To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, 
including the levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or 
charges against governmental units, departments or agencies, 
including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, 
facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such 
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide 
methods of collections and penalties, including denial of service 
for nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges. 
LC. § 50-1030(f) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 50-1028 prohibits municipalities from 
operating works under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act as a primary source of revenue to the city. 
The term "works" is defined as, "water systems, drainage systems, sewerage systems, recreation 
facilities, off-street parking facilities, airport facilities and air navigation facilities, electric 
systems or any of them as herein defined." LC.§ 50-1029(a). 
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1. Loomis provides a framework for municipalities to charge a lawful "equity 
buy-in" fee to a consumer connecting to an existing sewage system. 
Respondent's fee does not stand up to this scrutiny. 
In Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434 ( 1991 ), the Court considered and refined the 
"equity buy-in" theory of charging connection fees under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. An 
"equity buy-in" fee is based upon "the replacement value minus the remaining bond principal 
and cumulative unfunded depreciation." Id. at 436. This equity buy-in formula "allows the new 
user to buy into the [existing] system at the current dollar value [of the user's portion the 
system]." Id. 
In further assessing the legality of the fee at issue in Loomis, this Court stated that the 
Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the collection of sewer connection fees. The Court made it 
clear that if the fees collected pursuant to the Act are allocated and budgeted in conformity with 
that Act, they will not be construed as taxes. Id. at 439. In this regard, this Court has held that 
"a municipality may accumulate collected revenues from rates, charges or fees to fund the cost of 
replacement of system components in its public works projects which are ordina,y and 
necessary" Id. at 440 (emphasis added); Idaho Const. Art. 8, § 3. The Loomis court went on to 
provide examples of expenses held not to be ordinary and necessary, such as "new construction 
or the purchase of new equipment or facilities" that stand in contrast to the "repair, partial 
replacement or reconditioning of existing facilities," which the Court found were ordinary and 
necessary. Id. (quotingAsson v. City or Burley, 105 Idaho 432,441 (1983)). 
The leading case in distinguishing whether an expense is "ordinary and necessary" is City 
of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1 (2006). In Frazier, the Court held that the expansion of the City 
of Boise's airport's parking facility, although crucial to the operation of the airport, was 
nevertheless not an "ordinary and necessary" expense because the expansion could neither be 
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considered repair or maintenance. Id. at 5. Nor could it be "necessary," as the City could not cite 
a crisis, or even immediacy, regarding the expansion to be constructed within the next year; or, at 
today's build out rates, even over the next decade. Id. As a corollary, the Welch Corner report 
does not even state a projected date that the City could reach the projected population that would 
necessitate this new expansive sewer system. 
Given the formula used by Respondent to establish its sewage capitalization fee, the fee 
cannot be considered an equity buy-in. No portion of the fee is used for maintenance, repair, or 
upkeep of the existing system (the City has a bi-monthly fee to cover that), and the fee has no 
relation to the value of the existing system. It was calculated by considering the cost of Hayden's 
"wish list" of future capital improvements and dividing it by the number of future users the 
future system may someday serve. Its sole purpose is to raise revenues for the future expansion 
of Respondent's sewer system. 
2. The lower court's reliance on Viking was in error, as it is distinguishable 
from Respondent's sewage capitalization fee because the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act prohibits operating works primarily as a source of revenue. 
The lower court and the Respondent assert that the holding in Viking Construction v. 
Hayden Lake Irrigation District, 149 Idaho 187 (2010), authorizes Respondent to assess its 
sewage capitalization fee without regard to the existing sewage system's value or the lack of 
equity calculations. In Viking, the Hayden Lake Irrigation District charged a fee to connect to its 
domestic water distribution system. Id. at 190. A portion of the connection fee covered the actual 
cost of c01mecting to the water system, but the majority of the fee was intended to be the cost of 
buying an equity interest in the system. Id. The Viking court held that a portion of this fee may 
also be used "to provide a reserve for improvements to their works." Id. at 197 (citing LC.§ 43-
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1912( e) ). It would be difficult from the plain meaning of "improvement" to consider a $20 
million assessment used to triple the system capacity as an "improvement." 
In addition, the most important precedent articulated in Viking is that the taxing district 
must base all equity buy-in fees upon specific factual findings and calculations: 
However, for the connection fee to be an equity buy-in, it must be based 
upon some calculation designed to determine the value of that portion of 
the system that the new user will be utilizing. If there is no attempt to 
calculate in some manner that value, then the connection fee is not an 
equity buy-in regardless of its label. 
Id. at 194. The facts of the case at hand are also notably different than those presented in 
Viking especially in one distinct way: The Viking case involved a fee that was intended to be the 
cost of buying an equity interest in the existing system, whereas Respondent's sewer 
capitalization fee is solely intended as a revenue raising mechanism to provide funding for 
capital expenses for the community in the future. Respondent's study focuses on funding "capital 
improvements that must be replaced, enlarged or reconfigured so that system capacity continues 
to be available for future users." (R. Vol. I, p. 114 ,i 26) (emphasis added). By Respondent's 
own admission, Respondent's study is not based on "the value of that portion of the system that 
the new user will be utilizing" as required by Viking, but rather is a revenue raising mechanism 
to perform capacity expansion projects. 
Thus, although there may have been an incidental collection of fees reserved for 
improvement of the system in Viking, Respondent's sewage capitalization fee is assessed solely 
as a revenue raising mechanism. Under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, municipalities are 
prohibited from operating works primarily as a source of revenue to the city, which is exactly 
what Respondent is doing. Just because that revenue is earmarked to build future sewer works, 
as opposed to street or other works, does not save the illega1 fee. 
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D. The City's fee is not related to any service being rendered and therefore is not a 
user fee. 
1. City's capitalization fee is not a user fee. 
The City's tries to justify its capitalization fee citing support from Idaho Code§ 63-1311, 
which allows municipalities to charge a fee for the use of a particular service (a "user fee"). The 
lower court also used this Code section to uphold Respondent's fee: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the governing board 
of any taxing district may impose and cause to be collected fees for 
those services provided by that which would otherwise be funded 
by property tax. The fees collected pursuant to this section shall 
be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of 
the service being rendered. 
LC. § 63-1311 (I) ( emphasis added). There is a well-developed body of case law 
interpreting the above cited section of Code. These cases have produced tests to aid in analyzing 
whether or not a fee is a permissible user fee, or if it is merely a disguised tax. The tests look to 
the relationship and cost between the fee and the service being provided. 
This Court considered a fee very similar to Respondent's fee in the case of Brewster v. 
City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502 (1988). In this case, this Court was analyzing a "street fee" 
imposed upon property owners. The Court found that "the revenue to be collected from 
Pocatello's street fee has no necessary relationship to the regulation of travel over its streets, but 
rather is to generate funds for the non-regulatory function of repairing and maintaining streets." 
Id. at 504. Further, the Court stated "[i]n a general sense, a fee is a charge for a direct public 
service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at 
large to meet public needs." Id. at 505 ( emphasis added). 
As demonstrated supra, for the City's fee to withstand the scrutiny under the tests 
established in Brewster, the City needs to attribute the fee back to a service being provided. The 
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City absolutely cannot meet this test. As mentioned previously, the fee imposed was derived 
directly from the Welch Comer Report. The Welch Comer report did not consider the cost or the 
remaining capacity of the existing system whatsoever when setting the fee; it merely looked into 
the City's wish list of building a $20 million infrastructure into undeveloped areas of impact. (R. 
Aug., p. 0041-0042). The City argues that the fee is for a "system capacity replacement cost." (R. 
Vol. I, p. 71-107). The lower court also bought into this argument. (R. Vol. III, p. 643). 
However, there are no facts to back up the City's creative labe]ing of this fee. 
The capitalization fee at issue stands in stark contrast to the City's "bi-monthly" fee. The 
bi-monthly fee actually is a user fee; it provides money for the maintenance, operation and 
replacement of the current sewer system: 
There is hereby established a system of periodic service charges 
and fees in order to equitably impose upon all users of public 
sewerage systems the cost and expenses of maintenance, operation, 
replacement and other expenditures of this sewerage system. Said 
services charges and fees for purposes of computation shall be 
based upon: (a) the volume and contact of the fluent discharged 
into the sewerage system of the city; and (b) the actual and 
expected costs and expenses of maintenance, operation, 
replacement, upgrading and repair of the sewerage system, such 
charges and fees being determined to be the benefit derived by 
each building, structure or user of the collector system and regional 
facility. 
Hayden City Code 8-1-4. As one can see from the plain language of the ordinance, this 
fee is directly tied to the actual' and expected costs and expenses of maintenance, operation, 
replacement, upgrading, and repair of the sewer system services rendered directly to the 
customer. Thus, the bi-monthly fee is a pennissible user fee. Monies from that user fee maintain 
the collector pipes, the mains, and the lift stations, all of which are being currently used by the 
customers who pay the fee for its maintenance. A customer paying this fee benefits directly by 
discharging its sewer into the system, which is obviously a direct benefit. 
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It is hard to see how any customer in the currently developed area of the city would 
receive any benefit from proposed collector pipes, mains, and lift stations located out in the far 
reaches of the city's area of impact, where there is currently little-to-no development. 
The lower court believed that Respondent's fee was a user fee based upon its analysis of 
Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136 (1990) and Kootenai Property Owners Association v. 
Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676 (1989), discussed infra. As demonstrated below, the lower 
court's analysis under these cases is in error. 
2. Alpert v. Boise Water Corp. distinguished. 
Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., supra, is a franchise fee case and does not pertain to the 
same area of law present in this case. Even Respondent realized the distinction in prior briefing: 
"[T]hat exaction by the city is legitimate not because it is a user fee, but for reasons unique to 
franchises that have no bearing on the present litigation." City's Opening Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. Aug., p. 0041-0042). Nevertheless, the dicta Respondent 
relies upon refutes its argument more than bolstering it: 
"As noted in Brewster, the providing of sewer, water, electrical 
and other utility services to residents based on consumption of the 
commodity is a charge for a direct public service as compared to a 
tax which is a forced contribution by the public-at-large for 
revenue raising purposes." 
Alpert, 118 Idaho at 145 (emphasis added). Respondent's fee makes no attempt to link to 
a payer's consumption in the current system. Rather, the fee is calculated based on the estimated 
costs for future capital improvement projects to Respondent's sewer system divided by the 
estimated amount of future users. (R. Aug., p. 0041-0042). The fee goes to fund projects that 
are in no way associated with the payer. Instead, the revenues are used to fund projects located 
throughout the city that will be used to expand the capacity of the city's sewer system that will 
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benefit future system users. It is undisputed that Respondent's "sewer capitalization fee" raises 
revenues that are used exclusively on capital improvement projects. Deposition of Stefan 
Chatwin, pages 28:17 through 29:9 (R. Volume III, p. 574). 
Respondent's fee is strictly a revenue raising measure to raise funds to expand the 
existing sewage system to provide infrastructure that is of a common benefit to the community 
and therefore, it is a tax. The Welch Comer report recognized this to be a tax, even stating "these 
elements of the City's sanitary sewer system are considered infrastructure, which is of a common 
benefit to the community." (R. Aug., p. 0040 ,r 1). 
3. Kootenai Property Owners Association is inapplicable to the case at hand. 
Respondent convinced the lower court that Kootenai County Owners Assn. v. Kootenai 
County, supra, justified its fee. However, the Court and Respondent inappropriately rely on this 
case, as the Kootenai County Court was not considering or applying Idaho Code § 63-1311. 
Rather, the Court applied a completely different statute, Idaho Code § 31-4403, which pertains to 
landfill sites and gives the commissioners a statutory duty to "acquire sites." Kootenai County, 
115 Idaho at 678-679. Further, the Court explained that "[t]he basis upon which the ordinance 
in Brewster was overturned - that it lacked specific legislative authorization - is not present 
here." Id. at 680. 
Respondent argued before the trial court that the authorization in Idaho Code § 63-
1311 (1) is even broader than the one that was sufficient to uphold the user fee in Kootenai 
County Owners Association. (R. Vol. III, p.6141 5). On the contrary, Idaho Code§ 63-1311(1) 
only pennits charging a fee that is "reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the actual cost of 
the service being rendered." As established supra, Hayden's fee is based on the costs of a series 
of future capital improvement projects and has no reasonable relation to the services being 
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rendered to the current particular consumer. Were Respondent's interpretation of Idaho Code § 
63-1311 (1) to be adopted, there would be no such thing as an impermissible fee, since 
municipalities would be allowed to charge any fee they desired so long as it was loosely tied to 
some government function. Such an interpretation is quite contrary to the Court's holding in 
Brewster and all other case law applicable to municipal taxing authority. 
Respondent's capitalization fee fails when analyzed against the test established in 
Brewster that asks if the fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to a particular 
customer. The fee is only tied directly to a future sewer system envisioned by the City, which the 
current customer cannot even use. The fee is a tax used to meet the needs of the public at large 
and is thus impermissible. 
IV. REQUEST FOR COSTS 
NIBCA does not request attorney's fees, but requests an award of costs incurred in this 
appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, NIBCA respectfully requests this Court void the City's illegal fee as it has 
no basis in Idaho law, either as an equity buy-in fee or a user fee. 
Respectfully submitted this 1th day of April, 2014. 
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